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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 55 WINTER 1981 NUMBER 2
RECENT EXPANSION IN FEDERAL
JURISDICTION: A CALL FOR RESTRAINT
JOHN R. BARTELS*
In 1974 my late colleague, Judge Orrin G. Judd, wrote in the
American Bar Journal on the expanding jurisdiction of the federal
courts.1 He concluded that the expansion was caused by congres-
sional legislation, decisions of the appellate courts, and the natural
increase in the volume of cases.2 Since that time, while the breadth
of federal jurisdiction has continued to enlarge, the causes of such
expansion have remained unchanged. Indeed, Chief Justice Burger,
* United States District Judge, Eastern District of New York. A.B., Johns Hopkins,
1920; LL.B., Harvard, 1923. For his assistance in the preparation of this article the author
expresses his deep appreciation to his law clerk Michael S. Straus, A.B., Columbia College,
1972; M.A., Columbia University, 1976; J.D., New York University, 1980.
' Judd, The Expanding Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 60 A.B.A.J. 938,938 (1974).
Judge Judd noted that the federal court system was being "opened to litigants who never
were there before." Id. at 938. That system, and all its powers, are provided for by the
United States Constitution, article HI, §§ 1, 2. Section 1 specifies that:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.
U.S. CONST. art. m, § 1. The scope of federal judicial authority is outlined in article In, § 2,
cl. 1, which provides that:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdic-
tion;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party,-to Contro-
versies between two or more States;a-between a State and Citizens of another
State;-between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same State
claiming Lands under the Grants of different States, and between a State, or the
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
2 Judd, The Expanding Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 60 A.B.A.J. 938, 938 (1974).
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in his 1980 remarks to the American Law Institute, stated that:
In the past decade Congress has enacted not less than 70 new
statutes enlarging the jurisdiction of federal courts. Many of these
statutes expand federal jurisdiction to cover relief already availa-
ble in state courts. It is not unfair to say that the federal courts,
and ultimately the, Supreme Court, have tended to give expan-
sive, rather than restricted, interpretation to these statutes, along
with a narrowing of the scope of immunity of government
officials.3
In another forum, the Chief Justice wrote that "[t]he year 1980
brought continued and steady growth in the work of the federal
courts, more complex litigation, more novel cases, and hence moreproblems. ''14
One could properly ask: what is wrong with expanding the ju-
risdiction of the federal courts? The answer is that there is nothing
wrong with such expansion if it is necessary to protect constitu-
tional rights and other areas of special federal concern. If unneces-
sary for that purpose, however, such expansion is unjustified be-
cause it (1) creates concurrent jurisdiction with the state courts
and administrative agencies without reason; (2) increases delay and
expense in the adjudication of pending litigation in the federal
courts; and (3) increases the pressure on the federal courts expedi-
tiously to dispense with a more crowded docket,5 which in turn
I Welcoming Remarks of Warren E. Burger-American Law Institute, Hyatt Regency
Hotel (June 10, 1980).
4 Burger, A Holiday Message from the Chief Justice, THE THIRD BRANCH, Dec. 1980, at
3. According to Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit:
The biggest change, of course, is the expansion of the system and the revolu-
tionary change in the kinds of cases we get. This is largely a consequence of con-
gressional enactments during the last two decades but there have also been self-
inflicted wounds by the courts.
An Interview With Chief Judge Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., THE THIRD BRANCH, Dec.
1980, at 5. Chief Judge Haynsworth added that the self-inflicted wounds:
are principally [due to] the implication of new private rights of action from the
Constitution or from statutes which provide only for criminal sanctions or admin-
istrative regulation. I understand the temptation to provide a personal remedy to
one who has been wronged, though it may be sufficient from a societal point of
view that the conduct of wrongdoers can be controlled by administrative sanctions
or criminal prosecutions. The implication of such private rights of action, however,
contributes to the increase in the workload of the judicial system.
Id.
, The impact of a shift in cases from state courts to the lower federal courts ultimately
is felt throughout the federal judicial system. As the number of filings in district courts
increases, so, proportionately, do the number of appeals to the circuit courts, and inevitably,
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tends to affect the quality of justice.
In light of these concerns, it is appropriate first to analyze the
number and types of cases currently reaching the federal bench.
The evolution of the expansion of federal jurisdiction will then be
discussed, and the import of such expansion will be appraised. Fi-
nally, several reforms will be suggested.
PRESENT CASELOAD
A crowded docket does not in itself indicate the need for a
change in jurisdictional requirements. The courts might simply
need more judges. Certainly the recent creation of new district and
appeals court judgeships in the Omnibus Judgeship Act of 19786
was a needed balm, but the problem is not that simple. It is not
solely one of manpower. The overview of the types of cases ap-
pearing on the calendar for the years 1970 through 1980, contained
in the most recent Report of the Director of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, reveals a distribution of subject
matter which fairly may be questioned as being suited to harmoni-
ous federal/state relations.
According to this report, the approximately 29,000 criminal
cases commenced in district courts during the year ending June 30,
1980, represent a decrease of nearly 12% from the previous year's
total. Indeed, criminal case filings have been decreasing steadily
since 1972, when over 49,000 cases were commenced.
A significant factor in the decrease has been the implementa-
tion of new prosecution guidelines by the Justice Department.
Auto theft violations of the under-21 "joy-ride" variety are turned
over to state authorities, for example. Similarly, first-time weapons
violators are prosecuted in state courts, while the federal govern-
ment has focused its attention on handling convicted felons who
violate the weapons control laws. There has also been a policy in
favor of allowing the state courts to shoulder some of the burden of
handling bank robbery cases.
In contrast to the situation on the criminal docket, the total
the number of petitions for certiorari to the Supreme Court. See H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL
JURISDicTION: A GENERAL VIEW 47 (1973). Moreover, "[iln sharp contrast to decisions of
state courts, every decision of a court of appeals is a potential for the Supreme Court's
docket." Id.
0 Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629.
7 For a discussion of the problems associated with the "explosion" of federal court liti-
gation, see H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 15-54 (1973).
19811
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number of civil filings last year was about 169,000, an increase of
more than 190% over the 87,000 filings in 1970, and 280% over the
number of filings in 1960. In the Eastern District of New York
alone, the number of new case filings has grown by nearly 43%
since 1976 and by nearly 38% since late 1978. On June 30, 1980,
the pending backlog totalled 447 cases per authorized judgeship.
The rise in the Eastern District's backlog has occurred despite a
36% increase in the district's case termination rate since 1976.
Significantly, 25% of the burgeoning federal civil docket is
comprised of diversity cases, wherein federal courts are called upon
to make decisions on matters of state law. Since federal judges
probably are less qualified than state judges to judge state law,8
and since their decisions are not binding on the state courts, it is
no wonder that the most often repeated call for jurisdictional re-
form is the abolition of federal diversity jurisdiction. Moreover,
apart from the burden on the federal courts, litigants in diversity
cases may suffer serious delays.9 Of the 5,000 contract and tort
cases pending in the federal courts for more than three years, 3,500
were there on diversity jurisdiction.
Finally, another fifth of the federal caseload is taken up with
state and federal prisoner petitions. While filings by federal prison-
ers have decreased steadily over the past decade due largely to the
use of prison grievance procedures, state prisoner filings have in-
creased dramatically. State prisoner petitions alleging civil rights
violations under section 1983 have increased 600% from the 2,000
in 1970 to the over 12,000 filed last year.
Clearly, this brief analysis of the federal docket demonstrates
the pressing need for the formulation and implementation of mea-
sures limiting federal jurisdiction. The fashioning of viable reme-
dies, though, requires an understanding of the genesis and growth
of such jurisdiction.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The judicial power of the United States is vested in the Su-
preme Court and in inferior courts under article III, sections 1 and
8 Cf. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 101 S. Ct. 633, 637 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring).
While the state courts certainly have problems of congestion as well, the Conference
of Chief Justices of State Courts adopted the following resolution in 1977:
Our state court systems are able and willing to provide needed relief to the federal
court system in such areas as:. . . (c) The assumption of all or part of the diver-
sity jurisdiction presently exercised by the federal courts.
[Vol. 55:219
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2, and extends to all "cases" and "controversies" in law and equity
"arising under" the Constitution and laws of the United States and
treaties made thereunder. 0 Congress is charged on a continuing
basis with the task of allocating that power in order properly to
maintain the balance of judicial authority between the several
states and the Union itself.1" While Congress can neither restrict
nor enlarge the article HI grant of original jurisdiction to the Su-
preme Court,1 2 the distribution and modes of exercise of the bal-
ance of the judicial power were dependent on Congress' decision to
create lower federal courts. 3
The issues raised by the division of jurisdiction between the
state and federal courts are primarily issues of federalism, not legal
technicalities: they involve "the very stuff of American politics,"
not simply neutral judicial procedures. 4 Nevertheless, the trial
1" U.S. CONST. art. Ill, §§ 1, 2. See note 1 supra.
" U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. See note 1 supra.
12 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 173-74 (1803); Chisholm v. Georgia,
2 U.S. (2 Dal.) 419, 431 (1793). See also Corwin, Marbury v. Madison and the Doctrine of
Judicial Review, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTrrUTioNAL LAW 128, 131 (1938). Article I's
grant of original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, as interpreted by Marbury, is codified in
28 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976). Thus, the Supreme Court is vested with original and exclusive
jurisdiction over controversies between states and over actions against foreign officials. 28
U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)-(2) (1976). The Court has original but not exclusive jurisdiction over
proceedings brought by foreign officials; controversies between states and the federal gov-
ernment; and actions instituted by a state against the citizens of another state or against
aliens. Id. at § 1251(b)(1)-(3). Notably, although the legislature can neither restrict nor en-
large the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 173-74 (1803), it may provide for or deny the exclusivity of such jurisdiction. See Ames
v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449, 469 (1884); B6rs v. Preston, 111 U.S. 252, 259 (1884).
" Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845). Although the judicial power of the
United States is granted by the Constitution, it is a congressional prerogative to create
tribunals for the exercise of that power. Id. Thus, pursuant to article II[, the legislature may
or may not establish inferior federal courts. Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943).
Indeed, Congress "could have declined to create any such courts, leaving suitors to the rem-
edies afforded by state courts, with such appellate review by this [Supreme] Court as Con-
gress might prescribe." Id.
14 Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 500 (1928). One commentator has noted that:
When the First Congress met, the national struggle between the Federalists
and the anti-Federalists was reflected in the debates over the jurisdiction to be
conferred upon the federal courts. One group of anti-Federalists wanted no system
of lower courts at all, and would have left the enforcement of federal laws to the
tribunals of the states .... The Federalists, on the other hand, favored the es-
tablishment of a system of federal courts clothed with all the powers granted by
the Constitution.
Snepp, The Law Applied in the Federal Courts, 13 L. AND CoNrEMP. PROBs. 165, 165 (1948).
The federalist debate survives, in the Constitution itself, in article VI, § 2 and in the Bill of
Rights. On the one hand, the supremacy clause of article VI provides that the "Constitution,
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courts created under the Judiciary Act of 1789's had duties signifi-
cantly more limited than those faced by the district courts today.
The lawsuits with which the founders were familiar involved pri-
vate parties and private affairs with the general purpose on both
sides to limit intervention of the government. The common-law
principles providing the rationale for the resolution of such litiga-
tion were more than adequate.
In 1789, the jurisdiction of the district courts and the circuit
courts-which were in part also courts of original jurisdiction-was
confined to admiralty, criminal, and diversity cases, and to cases in
which the United States was a party. Notably absent was lower
court jurisdiction over cases specially identified as "arising under"
the Constitution or laws of the United States. Except for the brief
attempt to confer federal question jurisdiction on the lower courts
in the "Midnight Judges Act,""6 jurisdiction over such cases was
only vested in the state courts, with federal review lying in the Su-
preme Court from the decision of a state's highest court.17
Beginning with the outbreak of the Civil War, however, Con-
gress significantly expanded federal jurisdiction. In 1863, removal
jurisdiction was enlarged in favor of federal officers sued both
criminally and civilly for acts committed under congressional or
Presidential authority.18 The right of removal was extended to pri-
and the Laws of the United States" shall bind state judges, "the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CoNST. art. VI, § 2. On the other hand, the
tenth amendment provides that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
" Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
6 Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 13, 2 Stat. 89, repealed, Act of March 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1,
2 Stat. 132. The "Midnight Judges Act" had provided that in any case commenced in state
court and "arising under the constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made or to
be made under their authority," parties to the action could petition for removal to a United
States circuit court. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 13, 2 Stat. 89, repealed, Act of March 8,
1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132.
" See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 352-53 (1816); Act of Sept.
24, 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73. The "final judgment or decree" of the highest court of a
state is appealable to the Supreme Court when that judgment denies the validity of a fed-
eral statute; or sustains the validity of a state constitution or statute argued to be "repug-
nant to the constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States;" or denies a "title, right,
privilege or exemption" claimed under the Constitution or laws of the United States. Act of
Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976)).
" Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 81, § 5, 12 Stat. 755. The Act had granted federal circuit
court removal jurisdiction over civil or criminal proceedings initiated in state courts against
federal officers. Removal jurisdiction was restricted, however, to cases wherein the federal
officer had acted pursuant to executive or congressional direction during the Civil War. Id.
[Vol. 55:219
FEDERAL JURISDICTION
vate citizens in cases alleging official state interference with the
newly granted civil rights of the freed slaves.19 In 1867, the federal
courts received authority to review final state judgments through
the writ of habeas corpus.2 0 Additionally, the new civil rights acts
themselves guaranteed access to the federal courts.2 1
General federal question jurisdiction was finally conferred on
the lower federal courts in 1875.2 Since that time two main forces
have led to an extraordinary expansion in the variety and number
of cases in the federal courts: the decisions of the Supreme Court
and the relentless enactment by Congress of legislation of broad
scope and complexity, with the side-effect of providing a cause of
action to determine rights under such laws.
JuDmcLL EXPANSION
A plaintiff asserting his entitlement to a judicial remedy in the
federal courts must predicate his cause of action on a "right or
immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United
States."2 3 The mere grant by Congress of a benefit to an individual
does not mean that his right to the benefit is enforceable in the
first instance in federal court. Two important devices-implied
causes of action and an expansive construction of constitutional
rights-have, however, opened federal courts to classes of plaintiffs
to whom standing had never been explicitly authorized by
Congress.
Removal jurisdiction for state actions against federal officers survived the Civil War, how-
ever, and is presently codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1976).
" Act of April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 171 (codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1976)). Section
1445(a)-(c) of 28 U.S.C., which specifically delineates several nonremovable actions, evinces,
by implication, the breadth of federal removal jurisdiction. Actions which are nonremovable
are civil actions against a railroad, 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a) (1976), or against a common carrier,
id. at § 1445(b), and civil actions arising under state workmen's compensation laws. Id. at §
1445(c).
2 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976)).
2 See, e.g., Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, § 3, 18 Stat. 335 (codified in 28 U.S.C. §
1343(4) (1976) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1976)) (district courts granted original jurisdiction
over suits alleging denial of equal access to public accommodations); Act of April 20, 1871,
ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976)) (district courts granted origi-
nal jurisdiction over suits alleging deprivation of rights under color of state law); Act of May
31, 1870, ch. 114, § 8, 16 Stat. 142 (codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1976)) (district courts
granted original jurisdiction over suits alleging racially motivated interference with the
franchise).
23 Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976)).
Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112 (1936).
1981l
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Implied Causes of Action
Many, if not most, congressional enactments explicitly provide
for some form of agency enforcement, without specifying whether
in addition private parties may bring suit.24 In section 21 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, for example, Congress explicitly
provided for SEC enforcement of the various provisions of the Act.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has acquiesced in lower court de-
cisions recognizing a private cause of action under section 10(b) of
the Act.25 Furthermore, with respect to other sections of the 1934
Act, the Court has undertaken on its own to imply a private cause
of action.26 But in every case in which congressional silence is read
to favor a cause of action, a court "necessarily expands the scope of
its federal-question jurisdiction," without requiring explicit con-
gressional intent to do so.21
This is a disturbing trend, since the premise is unchallenge-
able that Congress, not the judiciary, is the branch of the govern-
ment to which the Constitution has assigned the task of delimiting
the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. While "[i]t is emphati-
cally the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is,''28 it is Congress' province both to create programs and
projects and to decide how rights under them shall be enforced."
When Congress refuses in an enactment to specify its in-
tent-perhaps on the assumption that the courts will carry the
ball-the court, it is submitted, oversteps the Constitution's
boundary line when it usurps that duty by construing the law to
24 See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 10(b), 21, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78u
(1976).
11 Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
2' See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964), wherein the Court im-
plied a private cause of action under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78n (1976). See generally Comment, An Analytical Framework for Implied Causes
of Action: Section 17 of the Securities Exchange Act and Redington v. Touche Ross & Co.,
59 B.U.L. REV. 157 (1979).
217 See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 746 n.17 (1979) (Powell, J., dis-
senting). Implication of a private right of action "runs contrary to the established principle
that '[t]he jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judi-
cial interpretation.'" Id. at 747 (quoting American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17
(1951)). Additionally, implication "conflicts with the authority of Congress under Art. III to
set the limits of federal jurisdiction." Id. See Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943);
Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922). Indeed, although the Constitution
"gives to the inferior courts the capacity to take jurisdiction ... it requires an act of Con-
gress to confer" such jurisdiction. Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922).
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
29 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
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express such an intent.
No federalism concerns are implicated, however, when the
court construes a provision like section 14(a) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 to provide a private cause of action, 0 since the
federal courts were already granted exclusive jurisdiction over its
enforcement. Nevertheless, a recent decision of the Supreme
Court, Maine v. Thiboutot,31 does give rise to questions concerning
the allocation of judicial business between state and federal courts.
In that case, Mr. and Mrs. Thiboutot proceeded through ad-
ministrative channels against the State of Maine under a state law
claim of right. They alleged that they had been deprived of welfare
benefits, to which they were entitled under the federal Social Se-
curity Act, because of the state's erroneous interpretation of cer-
tain provisions relating to dependent children. Subsequently, the
Thiboutots amended what had originally been a solely state law
action to include a pendent section 1983 claim. 2 They asserted
their supremacy clause contention that the federal standards con-
tained in the Social Security Act must prevail over the State of
Maine's regulations under that Act. The Maine state court con-
strued section 1983 to allow the Thiboutots a cause of action under
the Social Security Act-held not to be a "civil rights" law in
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization34-with the re-
sult that the Thiboutots were able to receive attorney's fees under
section 1988 of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of
1976.34
Reviewing the Maine Supreme Court's construction of the
scope of section 1983, on the State of Maine's petition for a writ of
certiorari, the Supreme Court concluded that the phrase "and
laws" as used in section 1983 referred to violations of any federal
30 See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964).
31 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980).
32 100 S. Ct. at 2503. Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. EIl 1979).
33 441 U.S. 600, 620-23 (1979).
4See 100 S. Ct. at 2503. Pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of
1976, the "prevailing party" in any action under section 1983 may receive "a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
1981]
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statutory enactment.3 5 It was not, as the State of Maine argued,
limited to laws providing for the equal rights of citizens. This
seems inconsistent with the Court's decision in Chapman. There,
section 1983's companion jurisdictional statute, section 1343(3),
was held to afford the federal courts a jurisdictional base for civil
rights actions only. 6 Sections 1983 and 1343(3) were originally
part of a single enactment.3 7 Indeed, as enacted in 1871, their cov-
erage was "coextensive."38
It would appear, therefore, that the scope of section 1983
should go no further than providing a cause of action for civil
rights cases. The import of Thiboutot, however, is that the Su-
preme Court has inferred a legislative intent to provide an express
private right of action in favor of persons aggrieved by a state's
administration of any one of a multitude of federal/state coopera-
tive programs. It follows as well that attorney's fees under the new
1976 Act could be awarded to any prevailing section 1983 plaintiff,
whether he prevailed on a civil rights or on a statutory claim. 9
Moreover, the fact that a plaintiff prevailed on the basis of a nego-
tiated consent decree, rather than on a final adjudication, was held
in Maher v. Gagne,40 a companion case to Thiboutot, to be an in-
sufficient ground on which to deny the award.4'
The practical consequences of the holdings in Thiboutot and
Gagne are worth examining. Plaintiffs seeking review of state wel-
fare determinations have always been able to bring their suits in
state courts, as did the Thiboutots in this case, with the potential
for federal review by means of a writ of certiorari. Thiboutot now
assures plaintiffs of a cause of action under which to bring their
suits in federal courts in the first instance, without the necessity of
appending their Social Security Act claim to a "not insubstantial"
constitutional claim.
- 100 S. Ct. at 2504-06.
so 441 U.S. at 620. The Chapman Court held that § 1343 "does not confer federal juris-
diction . ..unless ... [an] Act may fairly be characterized as a statute securing 'equal
rights' within § 1343(3) or 'civil rights' within § 1343(4)." Id.
37 See Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)
(1976) & 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. m 1979)).
See 441 U.S. at 616.
" Indeed, the Thiboutot Court awarded § 1988 attorney's fees, reasoning that such fees
"are available in any § 1983 action," and that "[s]ince we hold that this statutory action is
properly brought under § 1983, and since § 1988 makes no exception for statutory § 1983
actions, § 1988 plainly applies to this suit." 100 S. Ct. at 2506.
40 100 S. Ct. 2570 (1980).
41 See 100 S. Ct. at 2575; id. at 2577 (Powell, J., concurring).
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Notably, since Thiboutot involved a construction of section
1983, not the Social Security Act, its enlargement of the scope of
section 1983 to provide a cause of action to enforce compliance
with all statutory rights deriving from federal/state cooperative
programs is of significance beyond the welfare cases. The Court
has freed plaintiffs from the task of demonstrating that Congress
intended to provide a cause of action with respect to the specific
law under which they seek relief.
Before Thiboutot, for example, there was a split among the
circuits as to whether a private cause of action existed under the
Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act.4 2 After Thiboutot, section
1983 will provide aggrieved individuals with a general cause of ac-
tion in both federal and state courts. They will have the added
incentive of a potential award of attorney's fees, under the Attor-
ney's Fees Award Act of 1976, should they prevail. Moreover,
plaintiffs proceeding under section 1983 need not exhaust adminis-
trative remedies.43
Thiboutot's expansive interpretation of section 1983 poses a
threat to the balance of federal/state relations. The federal courts
may now sit in judgment on the decisions and actions of state and
local officials who administer complex regulatory programs, with-
out prior review and without an opportunity for correction by the
local governmental bodies who exercise immediate supervisory re-
sponsibility over such officials.
Another consequence of Thiboutot is that state and local offi-
cials, and their governmental bodies, will ultimately bear the brunt
of defending against suits that allege a wrongful denial of federal/
state cooperative program benefits. This is because plaintiffs will
tend to sue state officials rather than their federal counterparts,
4" The Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-467 (1976), provides,
inter alia, for joint federal and state action in the construction of bridges, canals, and dams.
The Ninth Circuit has held, and the Fourth Circuit has implicitly recognized, that a private
cause of action exists under the Act. See Riggle v. California, 577 F.2d 579, 582-83 (9th Cir.
1978); Chesapeake Bay Bridge and Tunnel Dist. v. Lauritzen, 404 F.2d 1001, 1002-04 (4th
Cir. 1968). The Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits, however, have held that a private cause
of action does not exist under the Act. See Williamson Towing Co. v. Illinois, 534 F.2d 758,
761-62 (7th Cir. 1976); Intracoastal Transp., Inc. v. Decatur County, 482 F.2d 361, 366 (5th
Cir. 1973); Red Star Towing and Transp. Co. v. Department of Transp., 423 F.2d 104, 106
(3d Cir. 1970).
"I Morgan v. LaVallee, 526 F.2d 221, 223 (2d Cir. 1975). See Steffel v. Thompson, 415
U.S. 452, 472-73 (1974). In Steffel, the Court held that claims premised on § 1983 need not
exhaust state judicial or administrative remedies before federal jurisdiction under § 1343(3)
exists. Id.
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since Thiboutot leaves unchanged the required showing that the
enabling act of the cooperative program provides for private ac-
tions against such officials. State and local officials are provided
with certain protections from liability in the form of good faith
immunity or absolute immunity.44 Additionally, states themselves
may be protected, by sovereign immunity, from retroactive damage
awards.45 In light of the Court's recent decision in Owen v. City of
Independence,46 however, municipalities "will be strictly liable for
errors in the administration of complex federal statutes," without
the defense of good faith.'7
Aside from the additional financial burden on the states, one
must seriously question on federalism grounds whether an intru-
sion of this magnitude into state and local affairs is a healthy de-
velopment. In the context of an alleged deprivation of civil rights,
federal review in the first instance may be an important safeguard
to the exercise of those rights. When entitlements under complex
federal/state programs are involved, however, the unstated premise
that state courts or administrative bodies are inadequate to the
task of judging conflicts under the supremacy clause cannot hold.
44 See, e.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561 (1978) (prison officials and officers
are qualifiedly immune from § 1983 damages); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417-24
(1976) (absolute immunity from § 1983 damages for prosecutors who, acting within the
scope of their authority, initiate criminal prosecution); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S.
563, 577 (1975) (qualified immunity from § 1983 damages for local school board members).
" See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). The Supreme Court "has con-
sistently held that an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by
her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State." Id. Although unconsenting states
are immune from retroactive awards, courts may, "consistent with the Eleventh Amend-
ment," grant prospective injunctive relief. Id. at 677. See also U.S. CONsT. amend. XI, which
provides that-
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
Id. But see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 451-56 (1976). Fitzpatrick held that "the
Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies .... are
necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
at 456.
46 445 U.S. 622 (1980). The Owen Court refused to confer either qualified or absolute
section 1983 immunity upon a municipality. Id. at 638. The Court reasoned that immunity
was only justified when it had been "established at common law" and was "compatible with
the purposes of the Civil Rights Act." Id. Municipal corporations, the Court concluded, had
no tradition of immunity. Id. See Comment, Strict Liability Under Section 1983 for Munic-
ipal Deprivations of Federal Rights?: Owen v. City of Independence, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv.
153, 160 (1980). Thus, Owen represents but another example of "the modern trend in sec-
tion 1983 jurisprudence to expand the coverage of that statute." Id.
17 100 S. Ct. at 2513 n.10 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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The federal issues simply do not predominate in such cases. On the
contrary, federal involvement is often limited to the appropriation
of funds. Moreover, even when federal standards are set for the
state administrative agencies, there are internal checks in the dis-
bursement of funds process to assure compliance with those
standards.
In summary, it is noted that Congress, with increasing fre-
quency, has passed laws which confer benefits on various groups of
persons. In some statutes, notably the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
legislature has explicitly codified its intent that individual citizens
vindicate their rights under those laws by means of private law-
suits. In others, Congress has indicated that enforcement should lie
exclusively in one of the several agencies. 48 In still others, Congress
has remained silent, and the Supreme Court has taken it upon it-
self to imply a private cause of action.49 In Thiboutot, however, the
Court in one stroke created a private cause of action under all con-
gressional enactments involving state action, thus making Con-
gress' actual intent irrelevant.50 This may represent an unconstitu-
tional self-delegation to the Court of Congress' power to expand
the scope of federal question jurisdiction.
Expanded Interpretation of Constitutional Rights
Another device for the expansion of federal jurisdiction is the
interpretation of constitutional rights. Thus, the federal courts
46 See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979). The
Transamerica Court held that Congress had intended the SEC to have the exclusive author-
ity to enforce section 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940. Transamerica Mortgage
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 20 (1979).
49 See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). The Cannon Court
held that a private right of action may be implied under § 901(a) of Title IX of the Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979).
50 In an appendix to his dissent in Thiboutot, Justice Powell set forth a list of statutes
that, after Thiboutot, may give rise to § 1983 liability. 100 S. Ct. at 2519-21 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). See, e.g., Small Business Investment Act of 1958, § 602(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 636(d)
(1976 & Supp. 1m 1979); Historic Sites, Buildings, and Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-
470t (1976 & Supp. IH 1979); Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-666(c)
(1976); Education Amendments of 1978, 20 U.S.C. §§ 2701-3510 (Supp. III 1979); Federal
Highway Legislation, 23 U.S.C. §§ 128, 131 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); Energy Conservation
and Production Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6892 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); Urban Mass
Transportation Act of 1964, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1618 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Laws involving
the construction and management of water projects would also be impacted by Thiboutot.
See, e.g., Water Supply Act of 1958, § 301, 43 U.S.C. § 390b (1976); Boulder Canyon Project
Act, §§ 4, 8, 43 U.S.C. §§ 617c, 617g (1976); Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, § 9, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 401-467e (1976 & Supp. m1 1979).
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have enlarged the scope of their jurisdiction by means of their con-
struction of such open-ended terms as "due process" and "freedom
of speech," as appears from various decisions in cases brought
under section 1983. Section 1983, by itself, confers on citizens no
substantive rights. It only enables judicial vindication of rights
otherwise provided by the Constitution or laws of the United
States.
For example, the first amendment has been held to safeguard
the rights of students to wear armbands in protest over the Viet-
nam War;5' to distribute information on birth control through
school newspapers; 52 and to engage in off-campus printing and dis-
tribution of obscene publications." The Supreme Court has also
affirmed the existence of a right to privacy, located in the penum-
bral regions of the first amendment and other constitutional
guarantees.
54
Furthermore, section 1983 has become the vehicle for suits
which would ordinarily be state tort actions, but which instead are
brought "[u]nder the rubric of the due process or cruel and un-
usual punishment clauses. . . . Of course, not every such claim
" Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513-14
(1969).
2 Shanley v. Northeast Independent School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 970 (5th Cir. 1972).
Shanley held that the first amendment rights of students could only be curtailed if the
exercise of such rights would "materially and substantially" interfere with school activities.
Id.
I 3 Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1081 (1980).
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973), wherein the Court held that the
"right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of per-
sonal liberty ... or ... in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy,"
id.; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972), holding that the right of privacy of an
unmarried person guarantees freedom to obtain contraceptives without governmental inter-
ference; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1975), which overturned a statute that
had prohibited the use of contraceptives by married persons.
55 Developments in the Law: Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1133,
1171-73 (1977). See, e.g., Russ v. Ratliff, 538 F.2d 799, 800 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1041 (1977), involving a section 1983 suit by a widow, relying upon a pendent state
claim for wrongful death, to recover damages for the shooting death of her husband by a
policeman; Curtis v. Everette, 489 F.2d 516, 517 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995
(1974), involving a section 1983 suit by a prisoner, relying upon a pendent state claim for
assault, to recover damages for the failure of prison personnel to restrain a fellow prisoner
from assaulting him. Indeed, it is arguable that section 1983 is "supplanting state tort law
and that the federal courts are displacing the state courts from their rightful positions as
the primary arbiters of basic standards of duty and conduct." Developments in the Law:
Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HAm'. L. Rav. 1133, 1173 (1977).
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can form the basis for a "constitutional tort," as the Supreme
Court emphasized in Ingraham v. Wright5" and in Paul v. Da-
vis. 5 The Davis case has been justly criticized for its inconsistency
with other of the Court's precedents, and its failure to recognize
that a person's reputation carries as much, if not more, of a prop-
erty interest than, for example, a welfare entitlement.5 8 But Davis,
notwithstanding, it remains true that a wide range of tortious state
action will provide a plaintiff with a claim for relief in federal
court.
Finally, civil rights violations have been held to occur when
prison authorities fail to provide inmates with a complete list of
books actually available in the prison library;59 when two or more
pretrial detainees are confined in single occupancy cells; 0 when of-
ficials refuse to notarize or mail the legal papers of inmates on the
basis of their personal belief that the form used is improper;61 and
when prisons fail to provide Jewish inmates with Kosher food if
they so request it.6 2
LEGISLATIVE EXPANSION
The jurisdiction of the federal courts was, of course, expanded
by the congressional enactment of a number of familiar statutes in
which an explicit right of action was created. These include the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, s the Consumer Prod-
- 430 U.S. 651 (1977). In Ingraham, two junior high school students alleged a right of
action under section 1983 for an otherwise authorized disciplinary paddling. Id. at 653. The
Court declined to apply the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment
to "traditional disciplinary practices in the public schools." Id. at 669.
'5 424 U.S. 693 (1976). In Davis, two police officers, attempting to inform local
merchants of possible shoplifters, distributed a leaflet which warned of the shoplifting activ-
ities of, among others, the plaintiff. Id. at 694-95. Dismissing the plaintiff's section 1983 due
process clause action, the Court held that the fourteenth amendment is not a "font of tort
law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States."
Id. at 701.
51 See, e.g., Note, Reputation, Stigma and Section 1983: The Lessons of Paul v. Davis,
30 STAN. L. REV. 191, 203-09 (1977); The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1,
86-104 (1976).
59 United States ex rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 129-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), afl'd,
573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
60 Detainees of the Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392,
398-99 (2d Cir. 1975).
6" Bryan v. Werner, 516 F.2d 233, 237-38 (3d Cir. 1975).
62 Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492, 495-96 (2d Cir. 1975).
3 Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 15, 18, 29, 42, 49
U.S.C.).
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uct Safety Act,64 the Toxic Substances Control Act,65 the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,6 the Federal Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969,67 the Black Lung Benefits
Act of 1972,68 the Fair Debt Collections Practice Act, 6  and the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977.70 Last spring alone, Congress
enacted seven additional statutes providing for additional federal
jurisdiction to determine disputes either in the first instance or on
review of administrative orders. 1
The responsibilities thrust upon the federal courts pursuant to
the enactment of this plethora of statutes deprive the bench of
time and judicial efforts which should be reserved for the more im-
portant litigation arising under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2
Through both explicit and judicially implied causes of action, the
Civil Rights Act exposes to federal judicial scrutiny, inter alia,
public accommodations, 3 public facilities, 4 public education, 5
6 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
"' 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
11 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18, 26, 29, 31, 42
U.S.C.).
G" 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-878, 951-62 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
68 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
89 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (Supp. III 1979).
o Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
See, e.g., Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, 94 Stat. 441 (codified in
scattered sections of 8, 26, 42 U.S.C.); Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 94 Stat.
553 (to be codified in scattered sections of 26, 30 U.S.C.); Federal Trade Commission Im-
provements Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 374 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 94 Stat. 349 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1997-
1997j); Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 974 (codified in scattered
sections of 16, 26, 42, 46 U.S.C.); Central Idaho Wilderness Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 948 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.); Asbestos School Hazard Detection and Control Act
of 1980, 94 Stat. 487 (to be codified in 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411, 3601-3611).
72 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000e-17 (1976).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3 (1976). Section 2000a-3 creates an explicit private cause of
action:
Whenever any person has engaged or there are reasonable grounds to believe
that any person is about to engage in any act or practice prohibited by section
2000a-2 of this title [discrimination in places of public accommodation], a civil
action . . . may be instituted by the person aggrieved . ...
Id.
I' 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000b to 2000b-3 (1976). Section 2000b-2 implicitly provides that a sec-
tion 1983 remedy is available to combat discrimination in access to public facilities. 42
U.S.C. § 2000b-2 (1976).
71 42 U.S.C. § 2000c to 2000c-9 (1976). Section 2000c-8 provides that a section 1983
remedy is available to obtain relief for "discrimination in public education." 42 U.S.C. §
2000c-8 (1976).
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public and private institutions," employment, 77 and sex discrimi-
nation in federally assisted educational institutions. 7e
Another significant legislative enactment was effected in De-
cember 1980, when the President signed into law P.L. 96-486,
which eliminated the $10,000 minimum amount in controversy re-
quirement for general federal question cases. 9 The impact of this
change on the federal docket will be felt in the following manner.
Plaintiffs seeking to adjudicate their rights under federal/state co-
operative programs may now enter the federal courts basing their
cause of action on section 1983 and jurisdiction on section 1331(a),
without having to append their welfare contentions to claims of
potentially doubtful "substantiality." 0 Thus, the combined effect
of P.L. 96-486 and the decision in Thiboutot will be to open the
federal courts to suits under any of the multitude of federal/state
entitlement programs, without regard to the amount in con-
troversy.
PENDING REMEDIES
The question is posed: where and when will the expansion
end? On February 27, 1977, President Carter submitted to Con-
gress a special message on reform of the civil justice system.
Among other things, he proposed the abolition of diversity juris-
diction, a requirement of compulsory submission to arbitration of
tort and contract cases involving less than $100,000, and the crea-
tion of an intermediate appeals court with expanded jurisdiction
for patent and trademark cases. This last proposal creating a new
court was passed in 1980 as part of a bill establishing a new Court
of International Trade with jurisdiction over "dumping" cases and
76 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1976).
7 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. II 1979). Section 2000e-5(b) creates
an explicit private cause of action for employment discrimination. To initiate proceedings,
however, a charge must be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission "by
or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved." Id. § 2000e-5(b). If the charge is dis-
missed by the Commission, the aggrieved party may institute a civil action. Id. § 2000e-
5(0(1).
78 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976). Although no explicit right of action is provided in section
1681, the Supreme Court has implied such a cause of action. See Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979).
7 Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369 (to be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
80 See, e.g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 542 n.10 (1974); Riddick v. D'Elia, 626 F.2d
1084, 1088 (2d Cir. 1980). A divided panel in Riddick upheld the substantiality of a claim
under the Social Security Act. Id.
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countervailing custom duty determinations."1
Following the President's lead, a number of bills have been
introduced over the past three years which would have a signifi-
cant impact on the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Several bills,
for example, would both "abolish diversity of citizenship as a basis
of jurisdiction of Federal District courts, '8 2 and "abolish the
amount in controversy requirement in Federal question cases. "83
Although the amount in controversy requirement has now been
eliminated,84 the more significant change abolishing diversity juris-
diction has little hope of being enacted. Another reform, the Court
Annexed Arbitration Act, would enact the President's proposals
concerning compulsory arbitration.8 5 This procedure has already
been tried on an experimental basis with success in some of the
district courts.88
As a means of further restricting the jurisdiction of the federal
courts to review state court proceedings under the writ of habeas
corpus, a bill has been proposed "to change the jurisdiction for the
consideration of, and the standards for the granting of, writs of
habeas corpus by federal courts upon the application of persons in
custody pursuant to judgments of the State courts. '8 7 The bill
would place a three-year limit after final judgments within which
habeas petitions must be brought, and would provide a more strin-
gent standard for the petitioner to meet before he would be af-
forded review of any factual issues decided by the state trial
court."8 The bill will be a curb on complete federal review in this
area.
8 9
81 Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (to be codified in
scattered sections of 5, 16, 19, 26, & 28 U.S.C.).
82 H.R. 130, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
83 H.R. 2202, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
84 Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94
Stat. 2369 (to be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
80 The Court Arbitration Act is designed "to encourage prompt, informal, and inexpen-
sive resolution of civil cases in the U.S. district courts by the use of arbitration." See Com-
ments of Senator DeConcini upon introducing S. 373, reprinted in 125 CONG. REc. S1253
(daily ed. Feb. 7, 1979). Under the bill, a district court can adopt rules mandating arbitra-
tion. Id. at S1254.
8 See S. REP. No. 96-74, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG.
& An. NEWS 1472-73.
81 H.R. 7997, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
88 See id.
89 Habeas corpus review already has been curtailed by the Supreme Court. In Wain-
wright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), the Court barred a federal habeas corpus court from
considering a claim not asserted at trial in compliance with state procedural requirements,
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CONCLUSION
If unreasonable expansion of federal jurisdiction is to be
halted, there must be more cooperation between the judiciary and
Congress in fixing and defining more precisely the jurisdiction of
the federal courts. By reason of the transfer to state courts of a
number of criminal cases, there has been some decrease in the
number of criminal prosecutions in the federal system, but the
time demands of the Speedy Trial Act of 197490 have mandated a
priority treatment of such cases which, in turn, has delayed the
trial of civil causes. This delay, coming at the same time as the
increased jurisdiction over civil cases caused by judicial and legis-
lative action in new and complex fields of law, has made it impossi-
ble for civil litigants to obtain their day in court within a reasona-
ble time. The effect has been that the number of pending cases of
the United States District Courts has increased from 93,000 to
190,000 in the last ten years. It appears that most of the increased
jurisdiction covers relief already available in state courts and,
therefore, raises the question of its necessity and whether or not its
effect will be to convert federal courts as special courts of limited
jurisdiction to courts of general jurisdiction similar to the state
courts.
Serious consideration must now be given to the following rem-
edies if there is to be any halt or restraint in further increases of
federal jurisdiction. First and foremost of the suggested reforms is
the elimination of diversity jurisdiction. Since 1965, proposals have
been made by the American Law Institute recommending a sub-
stantial modification of the diversity jurisdiction of the federal
courts.91 Chief Justice Burger, in a 1979 report on the federal judi-
ciary, stated that diversity is "an anachronism that should be elim-
inated.' ' 92 The Chief Justice noted that "[w]ith the increasing vol-
ume and greater complexity and novelty of cases reaching the
"absent a showing of cause for the noncompliance and some showing of actual prejudice
resulting from the alleged constitutional violation." Id. at 84. In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465 (1976), the Court denied state prisoners habeas review, in federal courts, of alleged
fourth amendment violations, so long as such prisoners had had a full and fair opportunity
to litigate their claims in the state courts. Id. at 494.
10 Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 28.U.S.C.).
91 See, e.g., ALI STUDY OF THE DIvIsiON OF JURISDICrlON BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS §§ 1301-1307 (1968).
92 Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary-1979, 65 A.B.A.J. 358, 362 (1979). As
early as 1973, the Chief Justice called for the abolition of federal diversity jurisdiction. See
Burger, Report on the Federal Judicial Branch-1973, 59 A.B.A.J. 1125, 1126 (1973).
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district courts, those courts should be relieved of cases in which
they must apply, not federal, but state law.""5
A second reform entails the preparation of congressional im-
pact statements prior to the enactment of new legislation. Up to
the present, Congress has repeatedly passed statute after statute
creating new federal rights without making any effort to assess the
impact of the imposition of these new responsibilities on the
courts. In this manner, Congress is expanding federal jurisdiction
to cover relief already available in state courts. Indeed, Chief Jus-
tice Burger has deplored the failure of Congress to require its com-
mittees, in reporting out legislation, to provide impact statements
that analyze the effect of proposed legislation on the federal
bench.9 4 Although the impact statements requested by the Chief
Justice have seldom been prepared by Congress, it so happens that
such a study was prepared in connection with the proposed Veter-
ans Administration Adjudication Procedure and Judicial Review
Act. 5 The study estimated that review of the Veterans Adminis-
tration disability determinations would lead to 4,600 new civil
filings annually in the district courts, which in turn, it is estimated,
would require the time of eight to ten additional judges, twenty
additional government attorneys, and additional supporting
personnel.9 6
A third area for improvement lies wholly within the realm of
the federal judiciary. Thus, the courts must exercise restraint in
11 Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary-1979, 65 A.B.A.J. 358, 362 (1979). Rea-
soning that state judges are "better equipped" to apply state law than federal judges, and
that the quintessential purpose of state judicial systems is to decide state law, Chief Justice
Burger advocated the elimination of federal jurisdiction premised solely on diversity of citi-
zenship. Id. See generally Rowe, Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: Positive Side Effects
and Potential for Further Reforms, 92 HARv. L. REv. 963 (1979); Sheran & Isaacman, State
Cases Belong in State Courts, 12 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1 (1978). But see Frank, The Case for
Diversity Jurisdiction, 16 HAv. J. LEGIS. 403 (1979). Several arguments offered to forestall
the abolition of diversity jurisdiction are that the caseload burden of state courts would be
increased; diversity jurisdiction is a "social service of the federal government;" diversity was
formulated by the founders of the nation and is now well-established; by promoting interac-
tion between state and federal judicial systems, diversity encourages states to remain aware
of, and ultimately, to emulate the federal rules; this very interaction "encourages the federal
system to borrow state improvements and experiments;" and a federal court is likely to be
more convenient for an "out-of-stater," and perhaps, more impartial. Id. at 405-10.
" Welcoming Remarks of Warren E. Burger-American Law Institute, Hyatt Regency
Hotel (June 10, 1980).
9' H. 6271, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
Statement of Deputy Assistant Attorney General Paul Nejelski before the Senate
Commission on Veterans' Affairs (Aug. 31, 1977). See generally Bell, Crisis in the Courts:
Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REv. 3, 14 & n.38 (1978).
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expanding federal remedies-via implied rights of action, for ex-
ample-in new and complex fields of law.
Recognizing the problems of federal jurisdictional expansion,
Senators Thurmond and Heflin introduced a bill97 to create a
"Federal Jurisdictional Review and Revision Commission" which,
if reintroduced and passed under the Reagan administration,
would establish a commission to study the relationship between
the federal and state courts, and report back with recommenda-
tions to the President, Congress, and the Judiciary. 8 Such a study
is long overdue.99
97 S. 3123, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
8 See 126 CONG. REC. S12766-68 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1980) (text of bill and remarks of
Sen. Thurmond).
9 As this issue went to press, a "judicial emergency" in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York was declared by the Chief Judge because of the
vacancies left unfilled for over a year coupled with a backlog in the calendar. N.Y.L.J., May
12, 1981, at 1, col. 4. As a result, trials of civil cases were suspended to allow the court to
comply with the demands of the Speedy Trial Act for criminal cases. Id.
